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Stephenson and A.: Usury--A Primer on the West Virginia Law

USURY-A PRIMER ON THE WEST VIRGINIA
LAW
Interest is "compensation for the use of the money of another
or for delay in paying a debt due another."' Laws concerning interest have been in existence since ancient times. One of the first was
delivered to the children of Israel by the prophet Moses.2 At English common law interest was not prohibited but a maximum rate
was imposed by statute in 1545.3 In Virginia the first maximum
interest statute was passed in 1730, legalizing a 6% rate.' The first
enactment of the West Virginia Code adopted a similar provision.5
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in maintaining that a contract containing interest provisions that is lawful
when executed should be enforced according to the intent of the
parties, recognized the legitimacy of charging interest.6 The court
has also recognized that even absent an express promise to pay
interest, a promise to do so may be implied by the court,7 unless
it appears the parties intended that no interest be charged.,
Usury is the reservation of interest exceeding the lawful rate,
taken directly or indirectly, for the loan or forbearance of money,
goods or other thing.9 This definition of usury has been the consistent statement of law in West Virginia since 1868,10 and before this
that of Virginia." This statement, however, is merely a definition
unsupported and unqualified by the substantial case law and statutory law needed to understand usury and its application. This
Note proposes to discuss the elements of usury needed for a practical understanding and application of its laws and principles to
credit sales under installment contracts for the purchase of personal property, services or interests in real estate. It is hoped that
this Note may also explain in a simplified way the most commonly
Shealy v. United States, 37 F.2d 918, 919 (1930).

Deuteronomy 23:19-20.
37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545).
1 See Edmonds, Virginia Law of Interest and Usury, 10 U. RicH. L. Rav. 77
(1975).
' W. VA. CODE § 96-5 (1868).
Peirpoint v. Peirpoint, 71 W. Va. 431, 76 S.E. 848, (1912).
Bennett v. Federal Coal & Coke Co., 70 W. Va. 456, 74 S.E. 418, (1912).
Peirpoint v. Peirpoint, 71 W. Va. 431, 76 S.E. 848, (1912).
Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 907 (W. Va. 1974);
Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159, 10 S.E. 375 (1889).
" Brakeley v. Tuttle, 3 W. Va. 86, 132 (1868).
" Kelley v. Lewis, 4 W. Va. 456, 460, 461 (1871).
2
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used means of computing interest or finance charges which are
provided for in the statutes. 12 Simple, add-on, discount and actuarial interest will be discussed. 3 It is not within the scope of this
12 W. VA. CODE

§§ 47-6-5, -Sa, 46A-3-101(2) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

13 Simple interest is defined in the language of the usury statute as "the rate

of. . . dollars upon one hundred dollars for a year, and proportionately for a greater
or less sum, or for a longer or shorter time . . . ." W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5 (1976
Replacement Vol.). Simply stated, this means that a person borrowing one hundred
dollars for one year at 6% simple interest will owe at the end of the year one hundred
six dollars and not more; if the period of the loan were two years he would owe $112,
if three years he would owe $118.
In simple interest loans the full amount of the loan or forbearance on which
the interest is calculated (the principal) is transferred to the borrower. He retains
and utilizes all the principal until it is repaid upon demand or at the end of the
term of the loan. The borrower pays the stated (nominal) rate of interest on the
loan each full year it is outstanding, or proportionately less for each part of a year.
This simple interest principle may be stated as: the interest charge or finance
charge in dollars is equal to the principal times the interest rate times the term of
the loan in years. Since there is no repayment of the principal amount in this type
of loan until maturity, the nominal rate is equal to the annual percentage rate
(APR). The term APR is used by the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665
(1970), to describe what finance mathematicians would term the actual, true, or

effective rate of interest. M.

NEIFELD, NEIFELD'S GUIDE TO INSTALLMENT

37-56 (1951). Simple interest in not extensively used today, except
in oral loan contracts and short term demand notes, because rates computed by
other methods yielding a higher APR are now allowed by law in most loan transactions.
In the add-on method of calculating installment loan payments, the interest
charge in dollars is first computed on the whole amount of the loan using the stated
nominal rate. The resulting amount is then multiplied by the number of years of
the loan and added to the loan principal. This sum is repaid, usually in equal
monthly installments, over the period of the loan. For example, when $100 is borrowed for one year at a 6% add-on rate of interest and principal and interest is
repaid in equal monthly installments, the interest charge is computed at 6% per
year and the resulting $6 is added to the principal. Dividing this sum ($106) by 12,
the monthly payment is $8.33. The key to this method is that the interest is added
to the principal to be repaid in installments. E. MOCK, R. E. SCHULTZ, R. G.
SCHULTZ & D. SHUCKrrT, BASIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 379-80 (1968).
In the discount method, rather than adding the interest to the principal in
advance of repayment, the borrower prepays-the interest charge. The creditor computes the interest charge on the loan principal for the whole term of the loan and
then deducts the interest amount in advance from the loan principal. Then he
hands the borrower the difference, called "the loan proceeds." The amount to be
repaid, however, is still the principal amount the borrower originally requested. For
example, if the borrower requests a loan of $100 and the creditor makes a 6%
discount loan, the interest amount will be calculated by the nominal rate at $6. One
hundred dollars less the $6 interest charge equals $94, the loan proceeds. The
amount due at the end of the loan term is, however, $100. The discount method
produces a higher APR than the add-on method since the borrower has less initial
COMPUTATIONS
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money to use over the loan period. Because the ratio of loan proceeds to loan
principal will diminish as the term increases, this method will generally be used
where money is loaned for fairly short periods. A borrower would be unlikely to
agree to the $40 proceeds that would result from a ten-year term $100 discount loan.
Ordinarily, the discount rate method will not be applied to credit sales transactions.
M. NEIFELD, NEFELD's GUIDE TO INSTALLMENT COMPUTATIONS 85-95 (1951).
The requirement of installment repayment of the principal amount of the loan
introduces a noticeable difference into a simple interest loan. In add-on interest
loans, the stated nominal interest rate will no longer reflect the true interest cost
of using the money borrowed. In discount interest loans, the existing disparity
between the stated rate of interest and the true rate of interest increases. Installment repayment of a loan results in an APR which is approximately double the
stated rate. The borrower pays interest at the original stated rate on the whole
principal during the whole term of the loan but, because the buyer repays in each
installment a portion of the principal as well as the interest due, the amount of the
principal available for his use declines with each monthly payment. On the average,
over the life of the loan he will have the use of about half the money borrowed.
With the adoption of the federal Truth in Lending Act, the effective rate of
interest charged in a transaction must be disclosed to the borrower as the APR.
While there are several methods of calculating effective rates, the actuarial method
produces the truest rate and is the effective rate method embodied in the APR. Use
of the APR in the more recently adopted West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act, W. VA. CODE Ch. 46A (1976 Replacement Vol.), reflects the modem
trend in maximum interest rate laws. Its use is the result of the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act and the underlying need for a universal rate that
accurately reflects the true cost of using money. Regardless of how a loan contract
is constructed in terms of time, number of payments and finance charge, or how
the interest rate is initially stated, the APR accurately represents a true rate of
interest the borrower may use to evaluate competing credit opportunities. The
interest calculations in many bank loan transactions and most credit sales transactions are now based strictly on the APR.
While the actuarial method produces the truest rate it also involves extremely
difficult calculations. The formula is displayed in Supplement I to Regulation Z,
of the Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. 226.5(b) (1977), as follows:

P1
Principal =
P1

P

Pn =

.

P2

+1- i) tl
.

.. =

T

2
(1 -+ i) t2

Pn___

++

+
(1+ri t n

amount of first and each consecutive payment

amount of last payment

i = monthly interest rate
t 1 , t 2 0 = 1, 2
tn = total no. of payment periods
If a loan involved repayment over several years the computation would be immense;
a loan over just four years would involve numbers raised to the 48th power. Fortunately the rate may be found in APR tables. The official source of these tables is
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Truth in Lending, Regulation
Z Annual Percentage Rate Tables, Volumes I, II. This source also includes information concerning computation of the finance charge and other factors needed to use
the tables, and includes applications of the tables to various loan transactions.
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Note to discuss: open-ended credit arrangements such as credit
cards or revolving charge accounts. 4 The purpose of this Note
then, is to define usury, set out and explain relevant statutes,
discuss statutes of limitations, consider the major defense to a
charge of usury-the time-price doctrine, and identify the penalties and forfeitures which may be assessed. It is critical to this end
to bear in mind that the usury law was amended in 1968, 1969, 1974
and-1978, and that the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act 5 (WVCCPA) to an extent displaced the usury statutes in
1974. The result of these changes is that the causes of action,
defenses and penalties that are applied to contracts differ according to the date and nature of the contractual transaction.",
Usury
Since its original enactment, the West Virginia usury statute
has always declared that "all contracts and assurances made directly or indirectly for the loan or forbearance of money or other
thing at a greater rate of interest" than allowed by law shall be
Using this information and the tables, the APR involved in a loan transaction may
be computed-or verified. Where the lawful rate applicable to a transaction is stated
in terms of add-on or discount interest, the verified APR can be located in "APR
to add-on" or "APR to discount" tables found in various publications, such as in
D. THORNDIKE, THE THORNDIKE ENCYCLOPEDIA oF BANKING AND FINANCIAL TABLES
(1973).
" Under open-ended credit arrangements the borrower is granted an extension
of credit, in advance, and he uses it at his discretion in increments as he purchases
goods. The borrower repays the creditor at his discretion either the whole amount,
a minimum amount or any amount he wishes until principal and interest is repaid.
Discussions of open-ended credit and relevant calculations of interest under
those arrangements may be found in Cardi, The West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 401 (1975), and in the federal Truth in
LendingAct, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977).
The Truth in Lending Act does not include any provisions setting maximum
interest rates or finance charges; it is a disclosure act. In part, it mandates the
method of calculating the "annual percentage rate" (essentially the effective rate)
that must be disclosed to borrowers. The state usury laws which provide for maximum rates of interest are neither annulled, altered or affected by the act. Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968; § 111(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1976). Interest rates
in open-ended credit arrangements are regulated by the West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act, W. VA. CODE-Ch. 46A (1976 Replacement Vol.); disclosure requirements are regulated by the Truth in Lending Act. These and other
federal interest provisions are beyond the scope of this note.
"1W. VA. CODE Ch. 46A (1976 Replacement Vol.).
"6 As will be more fully developed later, these amendments are not to be retroactively applied to prior contracts. See Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co.,
207 S.E.2d 897, 908, 914 (W. Va. 1974).
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usurious and subject to legal sanction.' 7 Throughout most of the
statute's history the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
interpreted the language to exclude its application to credit sales
of property, both real and personal.'8 The court had interpreted the
phrase "for the loan or forbearance of money"' 9 narrowly to include
only transactions in which the exchange of money or its equivalent
was intended."0
If a transaction ostensibly involving goods was to be found
usurious it was necessary to show that, although the writing alleged property as consideration in the transaction, in fact the contract was for the borrowing and lending of money and that the
allegation of property was a shift or device to cover a usurious loan
or forbearance.2 ' Although this interpretation of the law gave
meaning to the statutory phrase "made directly or indirectly," and
allowed the courts to look behind the form of the contract to the
substance and intent of the parties, it did not allow the courts to
apply the sanctions of usury to bona fide sales of property. It was
the court's opinion that'a note for the payment of a sum of money
given bona fide as purchase money for property, and-not a cover
for a usurious loan transaction, is not usurious even where excess
interest is called for in the form of a percentage on the principle
sum, is called interest and is above that rate allowed by law if such
interest is in fact a part of the consideration for the purchase. 22
" W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.). Comparison of the statute
in prior codes, beginning with the 1923 amendment to this section, and in the
court's statements of statutory law in cases decided as early as 1868 (Brakeley v.
Tuttle, 3 W. Va. 86), shows that the quoted phrase has been consistent throughout
its history. The amendments to this section have been concerned with the sanctions
and presumptions.
"1 Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1974).
Usury laws have not generally been applied to credit sales in the United States.
Note, Usury and Consumer Credit, 70 W. VA. L. R.v. 204, 205 (1968).
"1 The distinction between loan and forbearance is that a loan is a contemporaneous transaction involving the creation of a debt to be repaid, whereas a forbearance is a subsequent agreement between a creditor and debtor that permits the
delayed payment of a debt previously created and already matured, that is, due
and payable. Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W.
Va. 1974).
" Swayne v. Riddle, 37 W. Va. 291, 295, 296, 16 S.E. 512, 513,514 (1892); Reger
v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159, 166, 10 S.E. 375, 377 (1889).
22 Crim v. Post, 41 W. Va. 397, 404, 23 S.E. 613, 616 (1895). Although the court

cites a Georgia case for this caveat which broadened the extent to which a court
may look to find usury, the principle had been expressed earlier in Brakeley v.
Tuttle, 3 W. Va. 86, 135 (1868).
22 Id.; Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159, 166, 10 S.E. 375, 377 (1889); Morris,
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This exemption from the requirements of the usury laws is a court-

made rule characterized as the "time-price doctrine."

3

Modern Time-Price Doctrine
In 1974, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was
squarely faced with the problem of the validity of the time-price
doctrine as an exception to the usury laws in a modern retail installment sales transaction involving consumer credit." Since the
doctrine had not been questioned or construed since 1895,3 the
court chose to reconsider its validity and establish a new general
rule for the credit sale of property. 8
"If the negotiation between the seller and the buyer involves
a bona fide quotation of both a cash price and a credit price, the
transaction does not involve usury, even though the quoted credit
price is such as to exceed the cash price plus lawful interest
thereon." 7 Under the new rule the seller must in fact quote during
the sales negotiation the total sum that will be due if the buyer
chooses repayment under a credit arrangement (the credit price or
time price), as well as the sum that might be paid immediately in
cash for the property." Under the old rule, the seller need only
quote the cash price and the interest rate and negotiate the buyer's
agreement.2 1 It is necessary, if the seller is to avoid the usury law,

that the quotation of cash price and credit price be bona fide, that
is, in fact be made during negotiation. It is not enough that the two
prices are later inserted into a conditional sales contract, even
when the buyer signs it after its completion. If the sale of property
is really made on a cash estimate but time is given to pay the price
quoted and the amount is greater than the cash price plus legal
interest the transaction may, in fact, be usurious."0 "If a transaction is actually a device to evade usury laws, it is not saved by any
West Virginia Usury Law - Comments Upon the 1968 and 1969 Acts, 71 W. VA. L.
REV. 326 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
Carper v. Kanawha Banking &Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1974).
1 Id. at 910.
21 Crim v. Post, 41 W. Va. 397, 23 S.E. 613 (1895).
28 Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 910 (W. Va. 1974).
The Court noted that this rule is generally recognized in the other jurisdictions.
27 Id.
1 Id. at 912, 913. The federal Truth in Lending Act requires additional timely
disclosures. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1977).
Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159, 166, 10 S.E. 375, 377 (1889).
Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 910, 911 (W. Va.
1974).
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attempted differential between a claimed 'cash price' and a
claimed 'credit price.' "3' It is a question of fact for the jury
whether the sale is bona fide, and exempt from usury prohibitions,
or not bona fide, and part of a device to evade the usury statutes.2
The West Virginia court recognized four indicia that the jury
may use to test the presence or absence of usury. First, the jury
may look to whether both prices were seasonably and adequately
disclosed, that is, to whether the buyer was given a realistic opportunity to choose between a cash price and a credit price. Second,
where credit terms are expressed and calculated in terms of interest or percentage, an indicia in favor of usury arises. Third, the use
of terminology which is easily understood only by the commercially
sophisticated, such as "time-price differential," 3 "finance
charge" 3 or "add-on" and "discount" rate, 35 are further indicia of
a usurious loan covered by a shift or device. Fourth, usury is indicated in a sales-financing arrangement involving a third-party
lender, where a close relationship between the seller and lender
exists to the extent that the seller is arranging the financing, getting a kickback of part of the interest or splitting profits from
insurance premiums or other charges. Another indication that this
type of relationship exists is where form papers, often supplied by
the lender, are signed at the time of the sales transaction by the
buyer-borrower in blank. These practices raise the indicia that the
sale involved a bargain based on a cash price followed by a claimed
time price which may be among the financial terms of the conditional sales contract but not seasonably and adequately disclosed. 6
This last indicia is important where the buyer seeks to claim
the usury penalties against both the seller and lender or where the
31
2

Id. at 910, 911.

Id.

33This term is used to speak of the difference between an offered cash price
and a credit price for goods and is often used interchangeably with "interest charge"
as a cover for high rates. Id.
31Finance charge is another term often used synonymously with interest
charge, but may include fees other than interest such as credit investigation reports
and default insurance. It is a legal word of art, however, under both the federal
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1605(a) (1970) and the WVCCPA. In the
latter act, "loan finance charge" includes the sum of all fees, including interest
imposed on the creditor by the lendor, directly or indirectly as an incident to the
extension of credit. W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(23) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
1 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
u Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d at 911, 912 (W. Va.
1974).
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seller is attempting to hide behind what appears in form to be a
cash sale paid out of the proceeds of an independent consumer cash
loan. In the former situation, if the contract was made on or after
September 14, 1968, 31the party paying usury may legitimately ask
the jury for a double recovery in the amount of a maximum penalty
from each, both seller and lender. 8 If the transaction did, in fact,
involve a completely independent cash loan at an interest rate
above the lawful rate,"8 the lender would clearly be liable for a
usury violation as he could not assert the time-price doctrine as a
defense.
Commonly the third-party lender will supply the credit financing through the seller's assignment of the conditional sales
contract"0 to the third-party lender. Since a contract is usurious at
the time it is consummated or not at all," and since only the
consumer and the seller are parties to the contract, if it is usurious
vis a vis the seller it will be usurious in the lender's hands even
though he would be allowed a greater rate in an independent loan
2
transaction.

Essentially, the time-price doctrine is a fiction indulged in by
the courts. 3 On analysis it can be seen that the seller has actually
sold the good, financing the sale himself by lending the buyer the
purchase price. The difference between the cash and credit price
is interest on this loan, no matter what language the parties chose
to place in the contract.
In cases falling under the WVCCPA, the legislature has apparently eliminated the time-price doctrine by requiring that any
3 The effective date of the 1968 amendment to the usury laws. Act of Sept.
14, 1968, ch. 7, 1968 W. Va. Acts 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1382.
Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 921 (W. Va. 1974).
=' There is no one lawful rate for all lenders. The lawful rate as provided by
statute depends on the statutory class of lender and is varied by the type and
amount of the sale or loan involved; the range is 6% to 36%.
,0 Often in the close-relationship situation the ultimate financier will supply
the conditional sales contract forms which will include a notice of potential assignment! of the instrument to itself for collection.
" Hall v. Mortgage Sec. Corp. of America, 119 W. Va. 140, 145, 146, 147, 192
S.E. 145, 148, 149 (1937).
42 For example, a "supervised lender," while not exempt from usury laws, may
charge higher interest rates than the seller himself could charge; these rates vary
up to a maximum of 18, 24 and 36 per cent depending on the amount borrowed.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-107 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
4 Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 923 (W. Va. 1974)
(concurring opinion).
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time-price differential must be included as part of the finance
charge on a consumer loan or sale agreement." Since including the
differential will raise the rate of finance charge and since that
charge is subject to a statutorily set maximum rate, creditors will
no longer be permitted to rely on the doctrine to charge consumers
usurious interest rates. Although the time-price doctrine is still
partially alie in West Virginia, 5 the Supreme Court of Appeals
has expressed its disdain for the doctrine in cases arising under the
usury statutes and now requires close scrutiny of a transaction
when the doctrine is relied on by a lender." Thus, the judicial stage
is set for elimination of the time-price doctrine in all cases involving potentially usurious interest charges. 7
Charges Included in Interest
Before a transaction can be found usurious, it is necessary to
determine whether incidental charges that may have been made
are includable as interest, or are legitimate, separate expenses properly paid by the borrower. If the transaction falls under the
WVCCPA this determination can be made by looking to the relevant provisions." If, however, the action arises under the usury
statutes, one must look to past cases for guidance on this question.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has dealt with this
issue under the long standing rule that "a contract is usurious
when any premium, profit, bonus, or charge is exacted or required
by the lender in excess of the money actually loaned, which in
addition to the interest stipulated, renders the return to the lender
greater than the lawful rate of interest.""
The court has found usury when, in addition to the lawful rate
of interest the following charges were made on a loan: when the
lender, as a condition to a loan, required the borrower to pay past
judgments entered in the lender's favor;5" when a bonus was given
as consideration for an extension of time to repay a loan;5 ' and,
W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(39) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Michigan National Bank v. Mattingly, 212 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1975).
" Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1974).
7 The time-price doctrine is also going by the wayside in other states. The
leading case is Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641
"

(1970).
§§ 46A-1-102(23), -(39), -3-109 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Janes v. Felton, 99 W. Va. 407, 415, 129 S.E. 482, 484 (1925).

" W. VA. CoDE
"

oId.
"

Crim v. Post, 41 W. Va. 397, 23 S.E. 613 (1895).
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when an interest in oil and gas was conveyed as additional consideration for a loan. 2 In one case a borrower sought a loan from a
West Virginia lender. The lender received the proceeds of the loan
from a third party and turned them over to the borrower. Although
the court allowed charges made for services rendered by the West
Virginia lender, it disallowed charges, allegedly for brokerage and
underwriter's fees, made by the third party, finding the third party
to be the real party in interest to the loan transaction.53
Charges that generally would not constitute a premium or
bonus under the rule, and therefore would not be "interest," include: reasonable and necessary incidental expenses, such as title
examination fees or inspection costs on land offered as security for
the loan;5 and premium on credit life insurance where the premium charged does not exceed the premium charged to other persons
who do not obtain loans. 5 Interestingly, the court has not found
usury where finder's fee charges are involved, at least where the
finder's fee is paid to a third party who is not a true party to the
loan.55
Holder in Due Course
The taint of usury will follow notes57 into the hands of purchasers for value even though the purchasers are without actual notice. 8 Prior to September 14, 1968, relief from usury was limited
to avoidance of the excess interest charged.59 It was settled in West
Virginia that this avoidance was not affected by principles of negotiable instrument law." Therefore the holder in due course (HDC)
was not protected from the forfeiture. With the passage of the 1968
51Davisson v. Smith, 60 W. Va. 413, 55 S.E. 466 (1906).
51Hall v. Mortgage Sec. Corp. of America, 119 W. Va. 140, 192 S.E. 145 (1937).
"Liskey v. Snyder, 55 W. Va. 610, 46 S.E. 996 (1904).
u Heaberlin v. The Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 198, 171 S.E.
419 (1933).
" Hall v. Mortgage Sec. Corp. of America, 119 W. Va. 140, 192 S.E. 145 (1937).
In this case the parties also stipulated the following charges to be payable by the
borrower: survey costs, appraisal fees, recording fees, and the premium on title
insurance. Id. at 143-44, 192 S.E. at 147.
17A
promissory note is an unconditionalpromise to pay a sum certain in money
on demand or at a definite time, signed by the maker. W. VA. CODE § 46-3-104
(1966).
I Hall v. Mortgage Sec. Corp., 119 W. Va. 140, 147, 192 S.E. 145, 149 (1937);
Artrip v. Peters, 144 W. Va. 819, 821, 174 S.E. 524, 525 (1934).
" W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976
Replacement Vol.)).
0 Morris, supra note 22, at 335.
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8
amendment to the forfeitures and penalties section, ' the legislature gave recognition to the HDC status in usury law to the limited, albeit important, extent of exemption of the HDC from the
newly enacted penal sum.62 The statute 3left him still unprotected
from the forfeiture of unlawful interest .

Where there is only a conditional sales contract 4 involved in
the transaction there can never be an HDC, since no West Virginia
case elevates a conditional sales contract to the status of a negotiable instrument." Thus, "'any purchaser of a nonnegotiable claim
which is tainted with usury, even though he is an innocent purchaser and is unaware of the usury, is . . .liable to the borrower
. . "6"Furthermore, if an instrument which would be negotiable in every other way calls for an unlawful rate of interest, the
instrument is not negotiable as the terms of interest provide the
purchaser with actual notice of a potential claim and as negotiability is determined by what appears on the face of the instrument

itself.6"

Although the legislature had given limited recognition to the
HDC status in the usury laws in 1968, in 1974 with the passage of
the WVCCPA it withdrew that support from lenders involved in
6
consumer credit sales, consumer loans and consumer leases. On
take
lawfully
or after September 1, 1975, a seller-creditor may not
*! W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
,2Id. The borrower-debtor may recover a penalty of up to four times the interest agreed to be paid and in any event no less than one hundred dollars.
u The lender is liable in the sense that he may not collect any unlawful interest
and, to the extent that the borrower-consumer has already paid such interest it may
be applied to any part of the principle still due. Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159,
165, 10 S.E. 375, 377 (1889); Morris, supra note 22, at 334.
The penal provisions of the West Virginia usury laws are not applicable to
national banks doing business in this state as these are controlled by federal law;
however, federal law does require that national banks obey the maximum interest
rate provisions of state law in the state in which they are located, except that they
may charge more interest, one percent above the discount rate, when the Federal
Reserve discount rate is higher than the maximum interest rate permitted by state
law. 12 U.S.C. H9 85-86 (1974).
" A contract in which the obligor transfers possession of the merchandise immediately, but delays transfer of the title until the condition of payment by the
obligee is satisfied. M. NauFELD, NEIFELD's GUnDE TO INSTALLMENT COMPUTATIONS

(1951).
Carper v. Kanawha Banking &Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 915 (W. Va. 1974).
" Id. citing Morris, supra note 22, at 333.
Id.; W. VA. CODE § 46-3-119 (1966) (Official Comment No. 5).
" This is the operative date of the WVCCPA. W. VA. CODE § 46A-8-101 (1976
Replacement Vol.).
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a negotiable instrument, other than a currently dated check, as
evidence of the buyer-borrower's obligation to pay for goods, services or an interest in land,"0 thereby limiting the seller to nonnegotiable instruments such as the conditional sales contract. Furthermore, a HDC of a negotiable instrument taken in violation of the
WVCCPA is subject to all claims and defenses arising out of the
sale to which the original seller would be subject." For negotiable
instruments made and arising out of consumer credit sales after
September 14, 1968, and before September 1, 1974, the holder in
due course may validly raise his HDC status as a defense to a claim
for the penal sums allowed by the usury laws. Thereafter the HDC
may not raise the defense since the WVCCPA applies to limit his
status7' and also fixes new penal sums" to displace the old penalties73 for consumer credit sale transactions involving excess interest
charges.
Burden of Proof
Two standards of proof have been mandated by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia for use in usury litigation. They
are the burden of proving the violation by a clear and satisfactory
preponderance of the evidence and the burden of proving the violation by a mere preponderance of the evidence. The former is applied in cases where a contract in its terms provides for charges
which do not exceed lawful interest under the usury laws. In this
situation the instrument is afforded the presumption of regularity
and the proof of usury, by parol or otherwise, 74 must be strong to
overcome that presumption.7"
The latter standard of proof is applied where the instrument
in question shows on its face by its terms that the interest charged
exceeds the lawful rate.7 "Public policy is offended,""7 the intent
is apparent and there is no room for presumption.7 Where the
W. VA. CODE §
70Id.
"

46A-2-101(5) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2-101, -102, -103 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
- Id. §§ 46A-3-101, -102.

7'

7'
75

Id. § 46A-1-103.
Davisson v. Smith, 60 W. Va. 413, 422, 55 S.E. 466, 470 (1906).
Carper v. Kanawha Banking &Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 917 (W. Va. 1974).

7, Id. at 917, 918.

Id. at 917.
78 Heaberlin

v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 198, 203, 171 S.E.

419, 422 (1933).
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instrument would be usurious but for the time-price doctrine, the
standard must be that of a mere preponderance of the evidence." '
Choice of Law
When an action is litigated in West Virginia and a question
arises as to whether the maximum interest law of the forum state
or some other state will apply, it appears that the appropriate
choice of law rule is the rule normally governing the construction
of contracts." In the absence of anything in West Virginia public
policy inhibiting such a contract, the law of the state in which it
was made and is to be performed governs a contract's construction.8
The place of the making of the contract is where the final
binding act of execution is performed. Generally, this is the place
of its acceptance." If the facts of the case indicate the place of
T' Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 918 (1974).
A full discussion of usury and the conflict of laws is beyond the scope of this
note. Generally, however, a continuum of views exists on this question. One view
notes that courts evidence a desire to uphold potentially usurious transactions
whenever possible, finding the contract valid if it may be sustained by any law
having a substantial relationship to the contract. See, H. GOoDcH, HANDBOOK OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 111 (4th ed. 1964). The Restatement (Second) has taken

the position that the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties should be
enforced, so generally the interest rate stated in the contract should be binding
upon them. Thus the restatement has adopted the rule that a contract will be
sustained if its rate of interest is permitted by any state to which the contract is
substantially related and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the state
whose law would otherwise govern the contract. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 (1971). The view most favoring the borrower, adopted in
the WVCCPA, holds that usury is contrary to public policy, therefore the borrower
should be afforded the protection of the interest laws of his home state. W. VA. CODE
§ 46A-1-104 (1976 Replacement Vol.); See, Note, The Doctrine of Lex Debitoris,
55 CALIF. L. Rav. 123 (1967). Since the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
often prefaces the rule with the words "in absence of anything in West Virginia
public policy inhibiting such a contract," State v. Hall and White Co., 91 W. Va.
648, 653, 114 S.E. 250, 251 (1922), and since both the court and legislature have
indicated that usury is against the strong public policy of West Virginia, (Carper
v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1974); Hall v. Mortgage
Sec. Corp. of America, 119 W. Va. 140, 192 S.E. 145 (1937)), the path is obviously
clear to apply the last of the three views set forth in this footnote to all usury cases
litigated in West Virginia where a choice of law question arises.
"1 State v. Hall and White Co., 91 W. Va. 648, 653, 114 S.E. 250, 251 (1922),
applied in Michigan National Bank v. Mattingly, 212 S.E.2d 754, 756 (W. Va.
1975).
12 State ex rel Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp, 147 W, Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963);
Galloway v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 45 W. Va. 237, 31 S.E. 969 (1898).
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execution is in issue, parol evidence may be introduced, and the
question should be submitted to the jury.1 However, when the
transaction is a consumer credit sale, the interest charged cannot
exceed the amount permitted under the WVCCPA.
The Amendments
The usury laws that regulate maximum interest rates have
undergone considerable legislative change in recent years. 8
Amendments or additions were made in 1923, 1931, 1968, 1969,
1974 and 1978.7 As a result, creditors and borrowers, as well as
their attorneys, need to be aware that actions on contracts made
at different times involve different permissive rates of interest and
other considerations.
As a practical matter, the amendments of 1923 and the addition of a section in 1931 need not concern us since the lives of
installment loan contracts, except some real estate loans, and the
time periods of relevant statutes of limitations are relatively short.
The amendments and additions to the usury law are not retroactive. The legislature expressly declared that the WVCCPA is not
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mattingly, 212 S.E.2d 754, 757 (W. Va. 1975).
W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-104 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
The usury provisions of the West Virginia Code are found at W. VA. CODE
§§ 47-6-5 through -10 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
" Economically, a lender who is free to choose among alternative uses of capital will choose the investment which brings the highest return commensurate with
the degree of risk he wishes to assume. Should the market rate of interest on
investments with risk factors similar to loans normally made by the lender rise
above the statutorily set maximum rate that such lenders can charge, lenders will
direct their capital away from normal loan channels into more profitable uses. As
a result, sources of credit will dry up. When the market rate of alternative uses of
loan capital continues to rise, creditors and credit seekers turn to the legislature to
ask for an increase in the maximum permissible rate that can be charged on loan
transactions. In answer to this problem the legislature has amended the usury
statutes four times in the past ten years and has passed the WVCCPA. Since none
of these laws are retroactively applied, a determination of the type and year of the
transaction must be made before one can locate the appropriate statutory maximum interest rate and statutory. remedy applicable to the transaction. The 1978
amendment of the usury statute exemplifies the preceeding discussion. As the
reader will see from the discussion of the statutory law, the legislature has responded to this undulation in market rates by allowing the Commissioner of Banking to set a monthly maximum rate for a limited class of loans, and this allows the
law to respond quickly to changes in market forces.
0 W. VA. CODE §§ 46A, 47-6-5 to -9 (1976 Replacement Vol. & 1978 Cum.
Supp.).
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retroactive" and many times the court has held that the usury law
in effect at the time the parties become bound by an agreement is
the law that must be applied."
Pre-1968 Usury Ldw
The legal rate" of interest remains the same today as it was
in 1860-6% simple interest." Prior to September 14, 1968,12 the
maximum lawful rate of interest that could be reserved in an oral
or a written contract for the loan or forbearance of money or other
thing was also 6% simple interest,'" except as otherwise specially
provided by law."
In addition to providing for maximum interest the pre-1968
statutes provide that:
W. VA. CODE § 46A-8-101 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
" Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mattingly, 212 S.E.2d 754, 757 (W. Va. 1975); Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 914 (W. Va. 1974); Kelley
v. Lewis, 4 W. Va. 456, 461 (1871).
" The legal rate is the rate of interest allowed when an obligation calls for
interest but the parties did not specify any rate. Morris, supra note 22, at 327.
" W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.) (adopted from the Va. Code,
ch. 141, § 4 (1860)).
12The date on which the 1968 amendment took effect. Act of September 14,
1968, ch. 6, 1968 W. Va. Acts 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1381.
" Except in case where it is otherwise specially provided by law,
legal interest shall continue to be at the rate of six dollars upon one
hundred dollars for a year, and proportionately for a greater or less sum,
or for a longer or shorter time, and no person upon any contract shall take
for the loan or forbearance of money, or other thing, above the value of
such rate: Provided, that a charge of one dollar may be made for any loan
or forbearance of money or other thing, where the interest at the rate
aforesaid would not amount to that sum, and the same shall not be a
usurious charge or rate of interest.
W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
" Some other pre-1968 maximum interest rates specially provided by statute
include:
(1) state and national banks-6% discount. W. VA. CODE § 31-4-20 (1966).
Sections 31-4-1 to 20 were repealed by the Act of February 26, 1969, ch. 7, 1969 W.
Va. Acts 91, effective July 1, 1969, which also enacted a new chapter 31A, relating
to banks and banking. The new chapter provided for interest at the rate of 8%
simple interest on written contracts, and on installment loans at the rate of 6% addon or 6% discount interest. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-30 (1971 Cum. Supp.) (current
version at § 31A-4-30 (1975 Replacement Vol.)). An amendment in 1974 limited the
"
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(1) Any contract or assurance shall be void as to any interest
charged above six per cent."
(2) In any case involving a loan or forbearance where excess
interest is paid, the debtor may bring an action against the
creditor with whom the contract was made or to whom the
assurance was given to recover back the excess interest paid and
he may bring it against the original creditor even though he
paid the excess to the creditor's assignee or indorsee.11 By utilizeffective rate on the 6% discount method to 15% and the WVCCPA incorporated
this rate at W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-104 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
(2) building and loan associations-any rate of add-on or discount interest as
fixed by the association's bylaws. This rate has not been altered. W. VA. CODE §
31-6-17 (1975 Replacement Vol.). This section has been incorporated into the
WVCCPA. W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-104 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

(3) industrial loan companies-6% discount on loans of no more than two years.
VA. CODE § 31-7-11 (1975
Replacement Vol.)). This article was rewritten and the section was amended in 1974
to provide for interest at the lawful rate (W. VA. CODE §§ 47-6-5, -5a (1976 Replacement Vol.)) discounted. W. VA. CODE § 31-7-11(5) (1975 Replacement Vol.). This
section was incorporated into the WVCCPA. W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-104 (1976 ReW. VA. CODE § 31-7-6 (1966) (current version at W.

placement Vol.).
(4) credit unions-1 1/2%per month on the unpaid balance. This rate is unchanged. W. VA. CODE § 31-10-16 (1975 Replacement Vol.). The section is incorporated into the WVCCPA. W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-104 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
(5) licensed lenders under the Small Loans Act-3% per month on any amount
up to $200, 2% per month on amounts from $201 to $600, 1 1/2% per month on loans
from $601 to $800, and 6% simple interest for interest for any amount over $800.
W. VA. CODE §§ 47-7A-13, -15 (1966). Sections 47-7A-1 to 47-7A-26 were repealed
by the Act of March 5, 1974, ch. 12, 1974 W. Va. Acts 58, effective September 1,
1974, which also enacted a new chapter, Ch. 46A-WVCCPA. Included in this
chapter is the Small Loans Act rewritten and renamed "Supervised Lenders." This
new article provides for a maximum loan finance charge, by the actuarial method,
at the rate of 36% on the first $200, 24% on any amount of $201 to $600, 18% from
$601 to $1200 and 6% simple interest on any amount exceeding $1200. However, the
actual rate may exceed the maximums as the section permits the lender to make
the same finance charge on all principal amounts within a specified range. W. VA.
CODE §§ 46A-4-107, -111 (1976 Replacement Vol.). Supervised lenders may not
make multiple loans to avoid the declining interest requirement as prescribed in
the article. W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-108 (1976 Replacement Vol.). For a complete
discussion of the law applicable to supervised lenders see, Note, Consumer
Law-The Supervised Loan in West Virginia, 80 W. VA. L. Rav. 256 (1978).
" All contracts and a~surances made directly or indirectly for the
loan or forbearance of money or other thing at a greater rate of interest
than six per cent, except where such greater rate is specially allowed by
law, shall be void as to any excess of interest agreed to be paid above that
rate, and no further except where otherwise specially provided by law.
W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
" If an excess beyond the lawful interest be paid in any case for the
loan or forbearance of money or other thing, the person paying the same
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ing these two sections an affirmative claim may be brought by
the debtor. He may ask a court or jury to declare the contract
usurious and to award him the forfeiture of any excess paid by
way of damages or a credit of that sum against any principal
that remains unpaid. 7
(3) Any defendant to an action brought on a contract or assurance for payment by a creditor may plead generally that the
agreement is usurious. It is mandatory that the court prepare
forms for a special verdict on the usury plea as required in the
statute unless waived by the defendant."
The submission of interrogatories to the jury and the special form
of the verdict are not available to a creditor, whether he be a
plaintiff or defendant, as the statutory language is clear and the
may in a suit or action recover the full amount of such payment from the
person with whom the contract was made or to whom the assurance was
given; and it may be so recovered from such person notwithstanding the
payment of the excess be made to his indorsee or assignee.
W. VA. CODE § 47-6-9 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 47-6-9 (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
,1 Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 919-20 (W. Va.
1974); Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159, 165, 10 S.E. 375, 377 (1889). The court states
in Carper,at 920, that whenever usury is found by the trier of fact the statute, by
operation of law, voids the interest and the court must see that the verdict avoids
it. To reach the correct result, the court may amend a jury award.
"1 Any defendant may plead in general terms that the contract or
assurance on which the action is brought was for the payment of interest
at a greater rate than is allowed by law, to which plea the plaintiff shall
reply generally, but may give in evidence upon the issue made up thereon
any matter which could be given in evidence under a special replication.
Under the plea aforesaid, the defendant may give in evidence any fact
showing, or tending to show, that the contract, or assurance, or other
writing upon which the action was brought, was for an usurious consideration. Upon such plea the court shall direct a special issue to try and
ascertain: (a) Whether or not the contract, assurance or other writing is
usurious; (b) if usurious, to what extent; (c) whether or not interest has
been paid on such contract, assurance or other writing, above the legal
rate, and if so, to what extent; (d) if a verdict be found for the defendant
upon the plea of usury, a judgment shall be rendered for the plaintiff for
the principal sum due, with interest at the legal rate, and, if any interest
has been paid above the legal rate, the excess over and above that rate,
shall be entered as a credit on the sum due; but if nothing be found due
after applying all credits and all excesses of interest paid above-the legal
rate, judgment shall be entered for the defendant; and if the total of such
credits and interest paid exceed the principal sum due with legal interest
thereon, the defendant shall have judgment for the difference.
W. VA. CODE § 47-6-7 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 47-6-7 (1976 Replacement Vol.)); Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 918-19 (W.
Va. 1974).
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defense of usury is personal to the debtor." The defense of usury
is an affirmative plea,1" and it must always be pleaded or it is
waived"' even if it appears on the face of the instrument under
which the debt is claimed." 2
(4) Any debtor may compel the creditor in law or in equity to
answer under oath interrogatories that would prove a transaction usurious if he cannot himself prove it. He may demand to

know the amount loaned, the actual interest, and all bargains,
contracts or shifts relative to the loan. He may also get injunctive relief to prevent the sale of any security pending the suit. 3

This section also provides that when the debtor resorts to it for
discovery and relief the creditor shall recover his principal and
lawful interest."4 This section was designed to allow the debtor to
compel the creditor to discover the usury without subjecting himself to a penalty other than forfeiture of excess interest."5
(5) Corporations may not benefit either affirmatively or defensively from a plea of usury.''
One element of usury that the statutes did not expressly proSammons v. Hawvers, 25 W. Va. 678, 680 (1885).
'®Washington Nat. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Westfall, 55 W. Va. 305, 316, 47
S.E. 74, 78 (1904).
"I Investors Loan Corp. v. Long, 152 W. Va. 673, 678-79, 166 S.E.2d 113, 116
(1969); Holmes v. Basham, 130 W. Va. 743, 749, 45 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1947); Barbour
v. Tompkins, 31 W. Va. 410, 416, 7 S.E. 1, 4 (1888).
10 Barbour v. Tompkins, 31 W. Va. 410, 416, 7 S.E. 1, 4 (1888).
103
Any borrower of money or other thing may exhibit a bill in equity
against the lender, and compel him to discover upon oath the money or
thing really lent, and all bargains, contracts, or shifts relative to such
loan, and the interest or consideration of the same; and, if it appear that
more than lawful interest was reserved, the lender shall recover his principal money or other thing with six percent interest only, but shall recover
no costs. If property has been conveyed to secure the payment of the debt,
and a sale thereof is about to be made, or is apprehended, an injunction
may be awarded to prevent such sale pending the suit.
W. VA. CODE § 47-6-8 (1966) (current version at W. VA. Con- § 47-6-8 (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
,04
Id.

Ice v. Barlow, 85 W. Va. 490, 492, 102 S.E. 127, 128 (1920).
101
No corporation shall interpose the defense of usury in any suit or
proceeding at law or in chancery, nor shall any bond, note, debt, or
contract of a corporation be set aside, impaired, or adjudged invalid by
reason of anything contained in the laws prohibiting usury.
W. VA. CODE § 47-6-10 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 47-6-10 (1976
Replacement Vol.)); Monongahela Appliance Co. v. Community Bank and Trust,
N. A., 393 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. W. Va. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976).
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vide but which the case law does require is intent to exact usurious
interest. Usurious intent is essential. Thus, if the rate of interest
called for is above the lawful rate due to mistake of fact or miscalculation,' it is not usury."' However, whether a transaction is
usurious depends solely on the terms made or expressed at the time
of the bargain and not on the inward belief or intention of the
parties."' Where it is clear that the rate is excessive, courts should
require that the creditor-lender show good faith by the strongest
available evidence and not permit uncorroborated denials of
knowledge.'
1968 Amendments
The 1968 amendments to the usury laws, effective September
14, 1968, made three important changes:
(1) The lawful rate was increased to 8%simple interest including points"' for contracts in writing for the loan or forbearance
of money or other things. Permissible interest
under oral con2
tracts remained at 6% simple interest."

(2) The 1968 revision increases the forfeiture by declaring void
all interest charged in a usurious contract. In addition to the
avoidance of all interest this amendment provides that the
debtor-borrower may also recover a penalty from the original
lender or creditor or other holder not in due course of up to four
times all interest agreed to be paid but the penalty must be at
least $100."1

Prior to this amendment the only penalty for usury was the forfeiture of excess interest. The debtor may now legitimately ask to
recover the whole amount of the penalty from each and all the
parties named in the statute in a proper case. Arguably, the debtor
Stuart v. Livesay, 4 W. Va. 45, 50 (1870).
Pfeister v. Wheeling Bldg. Ass'n., 19 W. Va. 676, 718 (1882).
'
Kelley v. Lewis, 4 W. Va. 456, 459, 461 (1871).
"' Haymond v. First Nat. Bank, 115 W. Va. 345, 349, 176 S.E. 239, 241 (1934).
" The amendment also defined "points" as the amount of money or other
thing received by the lender as a consideration for making the loan in addition to
interest. Points is a premium expressed in percentage points of the principal
charged for making a loan and normally used in real estate loans. Act of September
14, 1968, ch. 6, 1968 W. Va. Acts 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1381 (curient version at
W. VA. COD § 47-6-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
'0
'u

11 Id.
"'

W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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may double or triple his recovery of up to four times the interest
agreed to be paid."'
(3) The amendment codifies the common law as to intent in
usury cases as it states that every usurious contract shall be
presumed to have been wilfully made by the creditor. Where the
debtor can show that an unlawful rate has been charged on the
face of the contract his burden of showing intent has been met.
The amendment also provides the creditor the opportunity to
avoid a violation of the penalty provision by correcting a bona
fide error within fifteen days of notice of an excess charge."'
1969 Amendments
In 1969, a section that specifically applies to installment loans
was added to the usury laws. This section, effective March 6, 1969,
provides more liberal interest rates to lenders."'
(1) It allowed a contract in writing to carry an interest charge
of 6% add-on or 6% discount so long as the total of all charges
of any kind or character was included with the interest in the
rate calculation." 7 For example, this provision raised to approximately 11.5% the effective"' lawful interest rate on these transactions when repaid in equal monthly installments over a period of one year.
(2) It provided as an alternative the 8% simple interest rate,
including points previously allowed."'
1974 Amendments
Two amendments were made in 1974. The first of these, effective June 3, 1974, changed the section concerning loans payable in
installments by:
(1) Limiting the effective rate of interest that could be
charged under the 6% discount method, which had been permit11

Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 921 (W. Va.

1974).
W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Act of March 6, 1969, ch. 79, 1969 W. Va. Acts 518 (current version at W.
VA. CODE § 47-6-5a (1976 Replacement Vol.)). The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia expressed the opinion that the 1969 Act would apply to creditors, as
well as lenders, who financed consumer credit sales. Carper v. Kanawha Banking
& Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 908, 916 (W. Va. 1974).
"I Act of March 6, 1969, ch. 79, 1969 W. Va. Acts 518 (current version at W.
VA. CODE § 47-6-5a (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
"' See note 13 supra.
"' See note 111 supra.
"'

"'
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ted in 1969, to 15% computed by the actuarial method. 12
(2) Deleting the requirement of including all charges of any
kind or character, in the interest rate calculation when the 6%
add-on or 6% discount2 methods provided by the section are used
to compute interest.' '
(3) Adding some rules and guidance for the allocation of
charges and calculation of rebates.n
The second amendment provided for a temporary increase in
the lawful interest rate allowed on loans made for the purchase,
construction, addition or improvement of single or multi-family
housing. Nine percent simple interest including points was permitted to be contracted for in writing from June 25, 1974, until July
1, 1975. To satisfy this provision the contract must have specified
that there would be no prepayment penalty and must not have
contained an escalation of interest clause which would allow future
increases in the rate charged. 12
1978 Amendments
4

12
In 1978 the legislature added a new section to the usury law.
The coverage of this section is limited to nonprecomputed"n loans
of money secured by mortgages or deeds of trust on real property
located in West Virginia. This act has no effect on installment
loans or on the usury laws applicable to installment loans.

The legislative purpose of the section is to enable the growth
of credit for the construction and purchase of adequate housing
and for the construction and purchase of buildings and improve"2 W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5a (1976 Replacement Vol.). "Actuarial method" means
the method of allocating payments made on a debt between principal and interest
pursuant to which a payment is applied first to the interest and the balance is
applied to the unpaid principal. W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(1) (1976 Replacement
Vol.).
,21
Id. § 47-6-5a.

122Id.
'
£

Id. § 47-6-5.

W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b (Cum. Supp. 1978).

Id. § 47-6-5b(b). "Nonprecomputed" refers to a non-installment loan in
which the total interest charge and the amount of payment required each period
are not computed in advance. Normally this type of loan is referred to as a demand
loan; the principal and the interest rate are known and although the terms of
payment are negotiated the borrower will usually be required to make at least the
accrued interest payments until the principal becomes due. A loan is precomputed
if the debt is expressed as the total of principal and precomputed interest for the
known loan term. Both add-on and discount loans are precomputed. New Rules on
Consumer CreditProtection, CONS. CRED. GumE (CCH) 4028 (1969).
'2
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ments for businesses and agricultural enterprises in this state. The
lawmakers have found this end will be served by affording lenders
a competitive return on their money, thereby increasing the
amount and availability of this type of credit at reasonable rates.,
To carry out this legislatively stated purpose:
(1) The state commissioner of banking is empowered to prescribe each month the maximum permissible rate of interest on
such loans.ln The rate may not exceed a monthly index of longterm United States government bond yields for the preceding
calendar month plus one and one-half percent. 'u
(2) Any contract interest rate set under the provisions of this
section shall be valid for the term of the loan contract even
though the maximum rate fixed by the commissioner might
change from time to time.ln
Contracts may not include provisions for increases in the rate during the term of the current contract, that is, the parties may not
directly contract for a floating rate of interest based on the
monthly maximum rate.'30 However, the parties may agree to short
due dates and then recontract repeatedly.
(3) Commitments to make nonprecomputed loans in the future are treated as contracts fixing the future contract interest
'U

W. VA. CODE §

47-6-5b(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978).

'27Parties

may elect to contract at any alternative rate of interest authorized
by another code provision. For example, the parties may choose the alternative
provided in W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.) (setting the interest rate
for contracts in writing) and in W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5a (1976 Replacement Vol.)
(setting the rate for installment loans). W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b(f) (Cum. Supp.
1978).
'n W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978). It may be fixed at a lower
rate than the result of this computation would allow; the commissioner may consider other factors in his decision each month. Some of these factors are prevailing
economic conditions, yields on housing mortgage and deed of trust loans in the
United States and on high quality corporate securities and the actual availability
of the subject credit at reasonable rates in West Virginia. Id. The commissioner
must publish by the twentieth of each month for the public and lenders alike the
maximum rate that will be effective on the first day of the next succeeding month.
Id. § 47-6-5b(d).
'2W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b(c)(h) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
' Id. A commitment to make a nonprecomputed loan in the future at a rate
of interest not exceeding the maximum rate within the month of commitment
constitutes a legally binding obligation on the lender to make that loan at the
agreed upon rate of interest even though the permissible rate has increased by the
time of consummation. The commitment may not include a condition allowing
increase to a higher permissible rate in effect at the consummation date. Id.
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rate within the maximum rate allowed during the commitment
month. "'
(4) The commissioner of banking must promulgate rules and
regulations requiring lenders to file with him quarterly reports
on loans subject to this section. 3'
It is not completely clear whether persons acting in their private
capacity may make this type of loan at the rates allowed by this
statute. For example, may a homeowner finance the sale of his
home at this new rate? The answer is probably no, as it appears
that the legislature intended this act to apply only to regulated
lending institutions such as banks, savings and loan associations
133
and other similar financial institutions.
West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act
With the enactment of the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act in 1974, 13 the makeup of consumer credit usury
was radically changed. Effective September 1, 1974, the Act displaced the usury laws as they are applied to most consumer credit
sales or loans.In
A consumer transaction is defined as a loan for the purchase
of goods, services, or interests in land, or a credit sale thereof, to
natural persons for primarily personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, by a seller or lender regularly extending
credit, where the amount financed does not exceed $25,000 and the
purchase is not made with a lender credit card or on a revolving
charge account. When a transaction falls within this definition, the
act will prescribe the maximum interest rate and provide penalties
for its violation. "' It prescribes maximum charges for all creditors
making consumer credit installment sales and consumer installment loans, and, as to the transactions covered, displaces any
existing remedies and penalties for usury as well as statutes regu37
lating the maximum interest rate.'
M'Id.
Id.
' Id.

§ 47-6-5b(h).
§ 47-6-5b(j).
§ 47-6-5b(b)-(j).
'
W. VA. CODE Ch. 46A (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'
The exclusions are: 1) credit to government, 2) sale of insurance, 3) transactions under public utility or common carrier tariffs if governmentally regulated, and
4) transactions by licensed pawnbrokers and secondary mortgage lenders. W. VA.
CODE § 46A-1-105 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'
W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102, -103 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Id. § 46A-1-103.
12
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The act also provides for the dismantlement of the holder in
due course protection previously given to holders of negotiable
instruments made in consumer credit and loan transactions. Holders in due course are subject to all claims and defenses one year
after the operative date of the act, that is, from September 1, 1975,
and possibly before then to a somewhat limited extent under the
provision allowing for a one year transition period. The transition
rule involves creditor notification to the debtor of his negotiation
of an instrument and debtor notice to the creditor of any claims
and defenses within one hundred eighty days of creditor notification. " ' The act also provides that an assignee, and a lender making
a consumer loan to enable a consumer sale, shall be subject to all
claims and defenses the consumer may have against the seller.
These provisions also involve a transition period in which the assignee or lender must notify the consumer-debtor and the
consumer-debtor must preserve his claims and defenses. 3'
Any claim or defense of excess charges may be asserted as a
setoff, defense or affirmative action at any time "' subject to the
provision that no action may be brought more than one year after
the due date of the last scheduled payment on the contract upon
which the action could be brought."' However, such claim may be
asserted as a defense, setoff or counterclaim at any time, without
regard to the limitation on actions."'
The forfeitures and penalties called for are more moderate
than previously provided in the usury laws. The debtor may recover the excess finance charge and in addition an amount determined by the court of not less than one hundred nor more than one
thousand dollars. The creditor has no liability for the penalty if
within fifteen days of discovery of an error and prior to the institution of an action he corrects the error.' Furthermore, once a suit
is filed, if the creditor can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the violation was unintentional or the result of a
bona fide error of fact and that it occurred in spite of his maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors and
violations, he will not be liable for the penalty and the transaction
will remain valid."' On the other hand, if a supervised lender vioI- Id. § 46A-2-101.
13'Id. 99 46A-2-102, -103.
2,0 Id. 99 46A-2-101(7), -102(7), -103(6).
22

Id. § 46A-5-101(4).
Id. § 46A-5-102.

"

Id. § 46A-5-101(4), -(7), -(8).

Id. § 46A-5-101(8).
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lates the interest provisions the loan is void and the debtor need
not pay the principal or interest and may recover any payments
already made."'
The maximum finance charge applicable to consumer credit
sales and consumer loans including those repayable in installments, other than those made by supervised lenders," 6 is 18% per
year "on that part of the unpaid balances of the amount financed
which is fifteen hundred dollars or less" and 12% per year on that
part of the unpaid balances in excess of fifteen hundred dollars.'
These rates are equivalent to a one and one-half percent per month
and a one percent per month finance charge on the unpaid balances, respectively. The section provides that the finance charge
may be calculated by add-on, discount or otherwise as long as the
finance charge does not exceed that rate permitted.'48 The interest
rates applicable to consumer credit sales of real estate,", those
involving retained title or a purchase money lien, and to loans and
sales involving amounts in excess of $25,000, remain those set out
in the usury statutes.'50
If the consumer credit sale involves a motor vehicle, the seller
may receive 12% on the unpaid balance when the sale is made less
than one year after the model year of the vehicle. If the sale is made
one year but less than two years after the model year of the vehicle,
the seller may charge up to 16% per year. If the sale is two years
after the model year designation the seller may charge 18% per
year on the unpaid balance. 5'
Statute of Limitations
It is clear that the statute of limitations on the right to bring
an action demanding the statutory usury penalty does not begin
to run until after the last installment payment is due or made on
a usurious loan or forbearance. However, it is not equally certain
that the same limitation applies to the other actions that may be
brought under the authority of the usury laws. The facts and holdings of the cases and the language of the statutes support the
application of the statutory limitation applied generally to actions
Id. § 46A-5-101(2).
See note 94 supra.
"T W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-101(1) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
u Id. § 46A-3-101(2).
"' Id. §§ 47-6-5, -Sa.
" Id. § 46A-3-102.
'
Id. § 46A-3-101(6).
"'
"'
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on contracts. 52 In addition to actions to collect penalties, the statutes provide for the recovery of void and excess interest, affirmatively and defensively.'53
The WVCCPA contains a limitation of actions section which
plainly permits an action to recover the penalty until the passage
of one year after the due date of the last scheduled payment. 5 , The
Act also provides for the recovery of excess interest within the same
time period.' With respect to transactions made prior to the
WVCCPA, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently held that a one year statute of limitations applies to an
action to recover the usury penalty provided for by the usury stat156
ute.
In the case of a demand note a lender-creditor may bring an
action anytime within ten years of its execution." 7 If the note is
payable in installments, the action may be brought within ten
years of the debtor's default.' Substituting a five-year limitation,
the same rules apply to equivalent oral contracts. The debtordefendant may plead usury in defense of these contract actions and
may recover any excess interest paid in the form of a credit against
the principal or, in the case where the credit exceeds the principal
due, in the form of a judgment against the plaintiff-creditor. "I
Actually, it is consistent with the acts of the legislature and public

M2
An action to recover money on a contract must be brought within five years
for an oral contract or within ten years on a written contract after the right to bring
the action has accrued. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6 (1966). An action to foreclose on a
lien secured by any trust deed or mortgage on real estate may be brought within
twenty years of the time the original debt becomes due; the creditor may extend
this period. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-5 (1966).
'" W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-5-101(1), -(4), '47-6-6, -7, -8, -9 (1976 Replacement
Vol.).
lu Id. § 46A-5-101(1), -(4). With respect to open-ended loans and credit arrangements this section permits an action for excess interest charges or the penalty
if it is brought within four years of the time the violation occurred.
'5'

Id.

Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 244 S.E.2d 321, 327 (W. Va.
1978). The amount of the penalty demanded may be based upon the whole amount
of the interest charge. Id. at 326; Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207
S.E.2d 897, 905 (W. Va. 1974); W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'5' Steeley v. Funkhouser, 153 W. Va. 423, 425-26, 169 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1969).
'
G.T. Fogle & Co. v. King, 132 W. Va. 224, 236-37, 51 S.E.2d 776, 784 (1948).
In Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mattingly, 212 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1975), the court
'-4

permitted the defaulted debtor to interpose the usury defense some six years after
the last installment payment was due.
5I Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mattingly, 212 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1975). W. VA.
CODE

§ 47-6-7 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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policy to assume the debtor must, after the amendments of 1968,
recover as a credit or judgment the whole amount of the interest
charged if the court or jury should find the contract usurious,
although the specific language of the applicable statute would only
allow the excess above the legal rate. 10
The usury law provides the debtor-borrower two affirmative
causes of action to recover excess or void interest already paid. The
first statute voids all interest called for in a usurious contract and,
as was discussed earlier, also provides for a penalty after 1968.61
The debtor in Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co. brought
his suit on this statute.12 2The second statute provides for the recovery of the full amount of any excess interest paid above the lawful
163

rate.

The statute of limitations applicable to the right to bring an
action under these sections of the usury law is the statute applied
to contracts in general-five years on oral contracts and ten years
on written contracts.'

Furthermore, these usury statutes provide

" Prior to the 1968 amendment to the usury statute section 6 voided only the
excess interest charged in a usurious contract. Consistent with that expressed policy
and purpose, section 7 of the usury law provided for a setoff against the debt
principal of only the excess above the legal rate (the legal and lawful rates were
identical prior to the 1968 amendment). The legislature strongly exhibited the
public policy purpose behind penalties against usury when it amended section 6 to
void all interest charged and to allow an additional penalty of up to four times all
the interest charged. It appears, in view of this legislative statement of strong public
policy against usury, that at the same time the legislature overlooked the logical
and consistent need to amend section 7. This oversight is further supported by the
fact that the legislature has repeatedly overlooked the need to delete the last sentences of sections 7 and 8 which refer to the former article seven of the same chapter
concerning small loans which was repealed by their acts of 1933. Furthermore,
section 7 has not been amended since before 1923. The language of this section is
inconsistent with the language of section 6 and inconsistent with the intent and
public policy purpose of the legislature expressed in 1968. Courts should read the
statutes together and allow the defendant debtor a credit or judgment of all the
interest charge found in a usurious contract. W. VA. CODE §§ 47-6-6 to -8 (1976
Replacement Vol.).
...W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.). See text accompanying
notes 113 and 114.
la 207 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1974).

2 W. VA. CODE
" W. VA. CODE

§ 47-6-9 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
§ 55-2-6 (1966); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-6-6, -7, -9 (1976 Replace-

ment Vol.); see Lorentz v. Pinnell, 55 W. Va. 114, 46 S.E. 796 (1904); Steeley v.
Funkhouser, 153 W. Va. 423, 169 S.E.2d 701 (1969); Carper v. Kanawha Banking
& Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1974). The old and well written opinion by
the Court in Lorentz v. Pinnell recites accurately the West Virginia law applied to
actions brought by debtors to recover void and excess interest. The debtor-borrower
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that all the usurious interest may be avoided, or, if usurious interest has been paid, the full amount of the excess may be demanded
within the period of the limitation.'
Another section of the usury law provides a remedy in equity
to compel a creditor to discover the usury for the debtor. He must
under oath divulge the true consideration loaned and all contracts,
bargains or shifts used to hide the usury, as well as the actual
interest charged.' 6 Since the creditor is compelled to discover for
the court his own wrong, the statute in equity forbids the exaction
of a penalty. Only the interest above six percent may be recovered."' 7 The courts continue to apply the laches principle in
equity,' but only when the discovery will work a hardship or injusexecuted a note in 1884 and made payments of interest at a rate in excess of the
lawful rate until 1900. In January, 1901, the maker's administrator repaid the
principal and the last year's interest. In the fall of 1901 the administrator brought
an action to recover all usurious interest paid on the note from 1885 to 1901. The
circuit court refused to apply any statute of limitations to the contract and awarded
the full amount of the excess to the debtor's personal representative. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the judgment of the lower court holding
that upon the facts presented no statute of limitations could be applied to the
yearly payments of usurious interest.
The court explained that since the excess interest was void by statute the
creditor had no legal right to collect it and the excess payments should have been
applied to the principal due. The court stated that, while "a court of equity is
bound by the statute of limitations, . . . when the law applies usurious payments
of interest as partial payments on the principal no cause of action accrues for the
recovery of usurious interest paid until the payments together exceed the principal
and legal interest," the statute does not begin to run until the cause accrues.
Lorentz v. Pinnell, 55 W. Va. at 118, 46 S.E. at 797-98.
The present court recently supported this law in Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile
Home Sales, Inc., 244 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1978). It stated that an action could be
brought without regard to the time of execution of a contract as long as the usury
was being paid. Id. at 326. Presumably, consistent with Lorentz, and other prior
case law, the court was stating positively that the statute did not begin to run at
the time of contract execution; but, rather, it begins to run at the time the last
payment is made or becomes due. This inference is consistent with the court's
holding in Snodgrass, 244 S.E.2d at 327, that the statute of limitations on the right
to bring an action for a usury penalty begins to run with the last payment. Of
course, an action to recover void and excess interest may be brought when excess
is paid anytime during the life of the contract; the debtor need not wait until he
has paid off the loan. Carper v. Kanawha Banking &Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897 (W.
Va. 1974).
' W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6, -9 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
"'

Id. § 47-6-8.

"'

Id.; Ice v. Barlow, 85 W. Va. 490, 492, 102 S.E. 127, 128 (1920).
Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 244 S.E.2d 321, 326 (W. Va.

1978).
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tice upon an innocent party such as a purchaser of notes without
actual notice of the usury. "' Absent this situation the debtor
should still be able to bring an action for discovery and excess
interest within the otherwise applicable statute of limitations on
contracts.
Usury Statutes and the WVCCPA: An Application
To illustrate the application of the body of law under discussion, we may assume that the factual situation in Carperv. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co. 0 occurred in several different years. In
Carper, the plaintiff purchased a mobile home from defendant
Fairmont Mobile Homes, Inc. The mobile home dealer arranged
financing with defendant Kanawha Banking and Trust Company,
and had the purchaser sign a conditional sales contract for $9,144.
Of this $9,144, $3,128.40 was characterized as finance charge, and
the remainder was identified as the amount financed. These figures were obtained by calculating interest using the six and one
half percent add-on method. The plaintiff brought an action
against both Kanawha Banking & Trust and Fairmont Mobile
Homes alleging that the transaction was usurious and requesting
damages of four times all interest agreed to be paid, or $12,513.60.
This amount is the maximum amount recoverable under the statute and is more than twice the original cost of the mobile home
purchased by the plaintiff.
The defendants maintained that the transaction was, as a
matter of law, exempt from the usury statutes under the time-price
doctrine. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that
whether the transaction was within the time-price doctrine was
a jury question and affirmed the jury's verdict of $2,500 against
Fairmont Mobile Homes and $2,500 against Kanawha Banking &
Trust Co.
If the Carpercase had occurred in 1967 the maximum interest
rate allowed by law for this type of transaction would have been
six percent simple interest and plaintiff's remedy would have been
to void the excess interest charged.' The transaction actually did
occur after September, 1968, when the maximum interest charge
"I Hall v. Mortgage Sec. Corp. of America, 119 W. Va. 140, 147-50, 192 S.E.
145, 149.50 (1937).
"' 207 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1974).
' W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976
Replacement Vol.)).
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was 8% simple interest and because the effective annual rate
charged was 11.23% the transaction was usurious. The remedy was
mandatory voiding of all interest on the loan and a penalty of up
to four times all the interest agreed to be paid,' $12,513.60. Had
the transaction occurred after March 6, 1969, the provision on
installment loans would have been controlling. Since the 6 1/2%
add-on rate charged by the lender exceeded the 6% add-on rate
allowed by statute, the transaction would have been usurious.,
The remedy available to the plaintiff would have been the same
as that allowed by the 1968 amendment. If it had occurred on or
after June 3, 1974, the court would have been faced with the question of whether a 6 /2%add-on loan that bears an actuarial interest
rate of less than the 15% maximum provided in the statute for 6%
discount loans would be usurious. Reading the statute literally, as
the court in Carper implied it would, the transaction would be
considered usurious and the plaintiff could have asked for a judgment of $12,513.60 and an order voiding all interest on the loan.
If, however, the transaction had arisen after the effective date
of the WVCCPA, September 1, 1974, the maximum interest rate
would have been 18% on the first $1500 of unpaid balance, and 12%
on the remaining unpaid balance."' Thus the transaction would
not have been in violation of the interest laws. The assumption
that the interest charged was greater than allowed brings to light
the disparities in remedies under the usury statutes and the
WVCCPA. Since the transaction would be a consumer credit sale
under the WVCCPA, the plaintiff's remedy would have been to
recover the excess interest charged and a penalty of up to $1000.111
Under the WVCCPA the maximum possible recovery in this case
is more than $11,000 less than under the usury statute.
Conclusion
For many, many years the lawful interest rate was set at the
traditional six percent. This rate was probably adequate prior to
the industrial revolution for aside from commercial needs there
was little private worker demand for credit. The economy was set
,n Act of September 14, 1968, ch. 7, 1968 W. Va. Acts 2d Extraordinary Sess.
1382 (current version at W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
I" Act of March 6, 1969, ch. 79, 1969 W. Va. Acts 518 (current version at W.
VA. CODE § 47-6-5a (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
"'1W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-101 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
175Id. § 46A-5-101(4).
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up on a cash and carry basis. Gradually, after the economic revolution brought on by the industrial revolution, the economy turned
to the present day buy-now-pay-later system-the consumer credit
economy.'
As the demand rose for a scarce supply of money some unethical creditors took the opportunity to make usurious loans. Many
creditors, in the complexity of modern financial transactions, inadvertently charged usurious rates of interest.
Into the midst of all this complexity, intent, and lack of intent, came the intense inflation of the 1960's and 1970's. There was
much demand that lawful interest rates be raised so creditors
could compete and the supply of credit money available to debtors
could meet their demand. Interest rates were raised in just seven
years to levels three times greater than what they had been for
nearly one hundred years.
In this state of flux and multiple change in the usury law, it
is very easy for one to let this body of usury knowledge go unlearned, become forgotten, or become outdated. Since 1968 the
lawful interest rate has been raised repeatedly. More likely than
not, usury violations have declined in numbers, but over the same
period the maximum penalties have increased. Many usurious
contracts have been written upon which the statute of limitations
has not yet run and the practitioner should be prepared to recognize usury for the benefit of his clients who are or have been subject
to debt obligations.
Richard S. Stephenson
George A. Patterson,III
'T

B.

CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGIsLATION 1-2 (1965).
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